Regarding calif.io/java4shell:
- It’s likely exploitable via openvoxserver and puppetserver. There’s some base64 encoding in the terminus, which when run via jruby probably bottoms out in this, and custom puppet code could also result in Java base64 calls. But we do not have the full scope of the exposure in all the code paths. (thanks @austb)
- It is only exploitable when running on x86-64 with particular AVX512 instructions (almost all modern CPUs have these). Check with
[[ $(grep -m1 '^flags' /proc/cpuinfo | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^(avx512f|avx512bw|avx512vbmi|bmi2)$' | wc -l) == 4 ]] && echo "You are vulnerable to Java4Shell." || echo "You are not vulnerable to Java4Shell."(thanks @Corporate Gadfly) - The fix is to update your java package as soon as your distribution ships the fixed package. This issue got leaked early, so the distros aren’t quite ready yet.
- We will update the openvox-server container as soon as these packages are released to Ubuntu and Alpine repos.
- Setting
-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsicsin JAVA_ARGS for the puppetdb and puppetserver services is a mitigation to shut off the affected code paths until the packages are fixed. This should not affect functionality, and only somewhat slows down performance with base64 operations. (thanks @runlolarun) - If you’re running container-openvoxserver, you can pass in the
OPENVOXSERVER_JAVA_ARGSenvironment variable, appending-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsicsto the default list of args, and similarly for container-openvoxdb, pass inOPENVOXDB_JAVA_ARGSappending the same argument to its default list of args. (thanks @Miranda Streeter) - If your server is internet-facing or having this issue exposed within your infrastructure is unacceptable to your threat model, consider shutting down the server/db services until you are able to apply the above mitigation or update the Java package.